



THE CHALLENGES FACING AFRICAN COURT OF 
HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 
 
 




The idea for the creation of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(the Court) was first raised in 1961, in the Law of Lagos Resolution1. But it 
was not until 1998 that the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of 
the OAU (the Assembly) adopted the Protocol to establish the Court2 which 
came into force on the 25th of January 2004. After some delay caused to the 
actual establishment of the Court due to the integration of the African Court 
of Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Court of Justice of the African       
Union3, the 4th AU Summit in January 2006 saw the election of the eleven 
judges.   
 
The rationale of the Court is to strengthen the regional human rights protec-
tion system, as it has always been the view that the regional system is weak 
and ineffective for it has always lacked an institution capable of producing 
enforceable decisions, mainly because the African Commission of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (the Commission) can only make recommendations. To 
provide the African human rights regime “with its missing link”,5 the        
Protocol not only has vested the Court with the power to render binding and 
* LL.B, LL.M, Lecturer in Law, St. Mary’s 
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1 “The Law of Lagos” Resolution in M. 
Hamalengwa and others (eds) The Interna-
tional Law of Human Rights in Africa (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Pub., 1988) on 37 
see Declaration 4 
2 Protocol to the African Charter of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of 
the African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (the Protocol), Ouagadougou, 1998. 
It came into force in 2004 upon the ratifica-
tion by the 15th Member State. At present  
23 African states have ratified the Protocol 
including: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire , Gabon, Gambia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Libya,  Lesotho, Mali,    
Mozambique, Mauritania, Mauritius,     
Nigeria, Niger, Rwanda, South Africa, 
Senegal, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda 
3 Decision on the Seats of the Organs of the 
African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec. 45 (III) 
Rev 1 produced at the 3rd Ordinary Session 
of the AU states “…that the African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 
Court of Justice should be integrated into on 
court” 
4 C. E. Welch, Protecting Human Rights in 
Africa: Roles and Strategies of Non-
Governmental Organizations, (Philadelphia, 
University of Pennsylvanian Press, 1995) 
Ch. 5 pg. 151 
5 B. Kioko, “The African Union and the Im-
plementation of the Decision of the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” 15 
Interights Bulletin, Vol. 1 (2005), 7-9  
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enforceable decisions6, it has also made provisions for the Court to exercise a 
relatively wide jurisdiction, as long as the Court functions in such a way as to 
complement and reinforce the Commission as per Article 2 of the Protocol.  
 
The Court is vested with three heads of jurisdiction: a) contentious, b)        
advisory and c) conciliatory and even these heads of jurisdiction are given 
relatively wide scope. The inclusion of the advisory7 and (to a lesser extent) 
the conciliatory jurisdictions8 within the Courts powers will ensure that the 
Court will be able to, over time, develop a persuasive or even authoritative 
status vis-à-vis member states. The reason is that the advisory jurisdiction 
under Article 4 provides the Court the option of a ‘soft’ method of promoting 
respect for human rights 9 which has the potential to win the acceptance of    
African states than a ‘hard’ method of condemning violations, which runs the 
risk of rousing a negative stance of state parties against the Court. Neverthe-
less, for the Court to be truly effective as a mechanism to protect human 
rights as  opposed to simply promoting it, the Court also needs and has the 
power to condemn violations and order appropriate remedies10 under its con-
tentious jurisdiction. This jurisdiction extends to all cases and disputes sub-
mitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, the 
Protocol and any ratified human rights instrument11 thus creating a forum 
where international human rights obligations (especially the Charter) will be 
enforced. 
 
So, while the scope of the contentious jurisdiction (ratione materiae) of the 
Court is quite wide, the Court’ locus standi provisions are comparatively  
restrictive thus limiting the jurisdiction of the Court in general. This is      
evident from the reading of Article 5 of the Protocol, which provides that the 
Commission, the state party that has lodged a complaint to the Commission, 
the state party against which the complaint has been lodged, a state party 
whose citizen is a victim of human rights violations and the African           
intergovernmental organisations (for matters under their jurisdiction) have 
compulsory standing. Access is also available in cases where individuals and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with observer status before the 
Commission wish to make a complaint under Article 5(3). However, this is 
an optional access only, in the sense that the state party against whom the 
complaint is being made must have declared its acceptance of the             
competence of the Court to receive cases under Article 5(3).12 
6 Arts 28 - 31of the Protocol 
7 Article 4 of the Protocol  
8 Article 9 of the Protocol 
9 Ap van der Mei, “The Advisory Jurisdiction 
of the African Court of Human and peoples’ 
Rights”, 5 African Human Rights Law Jour-
nal  (2005), 27-45 
10 Article 27(1) of the Protocol 
11 Article 3(1) of the Protocol 
12 As laid out in Art. 34(6) of the Protocol  
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From the short description of the Court’s features, the most striking aspect 
highlighted by the Protocol is clearly the fact that the Court can only function 
as long as it does so within the African human rights protection framework 
that already exists. Although, it is foreseen that the human rights regime al-
ready in place and the Court will be mutually reinforcing, there is a risk that 
the system already in place can weaken the way the Court will operate once it 
is up and running. Thus the next sections will explore the Court’s depend-
ence on the existing structures and how they may potentially present chal-
lenges for the Court.  
 
1. The Court and Its Ratione materiae Jurisdiction 
 
Articles 3(1) and 7 of the Protocol give the Court a broad jurisdiction by    
allowing it to interpret and apply the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (the Charter) as well as any other human rights instruments that have 
been ratified by the states concerned.13 This innovative provision has been 
widely welcomed as it establishes a court which has the responsibility to hold 
states to all their human rights obligations and to establish continent-wide 
standards.  To date, African states in general had shown a “willingness to 
subscribe formally to international and regional norms, while at the same 
time (violating) those undertakings with near impunity”.14  Although, the ad-
vantage of having a forum in which all these laws will be applied and en-
forced is an attractive proposition, there are two concerns that can be raised 
about the contentious jurisdiction of the court. Firstly, what will be the effect 
of the application of the Charter on the performance of the Court? And sec-
ondly what will be the effect of the application of all the human rights obliga-
tions of the states that have ratified the Protocol.  
 
1.1- Application of the Charter 
 
The African Court will interpret and apply the African Charter as a matter of 
course. This is as it has been ratified by all fifty-three African states.15      
Moreover, it is an appropriately African instrument, which very                 
progressively gives due prominence to all three generations of rights, around 
 
13 This provision is broader in scope than the 
provisions of the other two regional human 
rights systems. This is as new Art 32(1) of 
the European Convention and the Art 62(3) 
of the American Convention limit the con-
tentious jurisdiction of the Courts to the 
application of the Conventions and their 
Protocols. 
14 J. Allain & A. O’Shea, “African Disunity: 
Comparing Human Rights Law and Practice 
of North and South African States” 24 Hu-
man Rights Law Quarterly (2002), 86-125 
15  ibid  
78  MIZAN LAW REVIEW     Vol. 1 No.1, June 2007 
 
which the Court can establish norms that will be applicable to Africa as a 
whole, which will in turn contribute to a unified regional approach to human 
rights. Additionally, the Charter will be applicable as well as enforceable   
directly in a court for the first time, whereas in the past the Commission had 
applied the Charter but had failed to enforce any of its decisions or even 
gained substantive acceptance of its annual reports.16 Apart from this, the 
Charter has been mentioned in very few cases in the domestic courts and in 
most of these instances, only as an interpretive aid as opposed to being a 
fully enforceable source of rights.17  
 
However, despite the fact that the Charter will gain more important role in 
enforcing rights across the continent due to the Court, the Charter itself is a 
weak document. One of the major drawbacks of this otherwise innovative 
and comprehensive document is the fact that, although the Charter has       
provided for its own application by the Commission to fulfil its protective 
mandate, it has subsequently failed to provide the Commission with any 
power of enforcement.18 Even more crucially, the Charter also has             
substantive weaknesses such as the extensive number of “clawback” clauses 
incorporated into the articles setting out the rights19 as well as the potential of 
the abuse of the language of individuals’ duties in articles 27-29 of the   
Charter.20 It is these substantive weaknesses that will affect the Court’s    
functions and therefore present a challenge to the Court. 
 
In addition to allowing violations of fundamental human rights due to     
clawback clauses, the Charter can also potentially contribute towards the   
actual violations of human rights. This is due to the incorporation of           
individuals’ duties towards the state and the family in the Charter in Articles 
27 to 29. These “duties” have raised concerns generally over the hypothetical 
possibility of the prioritisation of the states’ rights over individual rights to 
16 Over the years, the OAU/AU Assembly 
and Summit of African leaders adopted the 
Commission’s reports without much discus-
sion but at the 3rd Ordinary Session of the 
AU Assembly, the Commission’s Annual 
Activity report was not adopted at all. This 
shows that the work of the Commission was 
either accepted for a formalistic show of 
adherence to the Commission or was      
rejected. 
 
17 F. Viljoen, “Application of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights by 
Domestic Courts in Africa” 43 Journal of 
African Law  (1999), 1-17 
18 C. E. Welch,   supra note 4 
19 M.  Mutua, “The African Human Rights 
Court: A Two-Legged Stool?” 21 Human 
Rights Quarterly (1999), 342-363 and M. 
Mutua, “The African Human Rights System: 
A Critical Evaluation”, Human Develop-
ment Reports (2000), Background Paper 
sponsored by UNDP at: http://hdr.undp.org/
docs/publications/background_papers/
MUTUA.PDF  
20 C. E. Welch,  supra note 4, pp 150-152 
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the disadvantage of the individuals’ freedoms.21 However, the more trenchant 
and specific critique is made in light of the treatment of rights of women in 
the Charter.  
 
The duties the Charter envisages in its formulation of peoples’ right are the 
duties one individual owes to another individual as well as to his/her        
community and state as well as the duties the states bear towards their       
respective subjects.22 Concerns about the potential abuse of the language of 
duties in light of women’s rights have been raised as the Charter provides 
that a state is to contribute to family life as the “custodians of moral and    
traditional values”.23 Commentators such as Claude Welch have pointed out 
that this may potentially have an unintended negative effect in that when   
interpreted narrowly within a conservative court/forum, this provision could 
result in the entrenchment of patriarchal norms, cultural practices and        
institutions that are harmful to women within the regional framework.24 Thus 
in this instance, the challenge for the African Court is to ensure that the 
judges exercise a progressive attitude towards women’s rights and interpret 
the language of duties in connection with article 18(3) which is intended to 
ensure the elimination of discrimination against women as well as the       
protection of women as stipulated in other international declarations and    
conventions.25 
 
1.2- Application of all other Human Rights Obligations 
 
From the analysis above, it becomes clear that the substantive weaknesses of 
the Charter will require the Court to apply the Charter in conjunction with 
other sources of international human rights obligations as the Charter cannot 
offer any enforceable protection in view of certain rights. This must have  
become obvious to the drafters of the Protocol as well, as they had the       
foresight to extend the contentious jurisdiction of the regional court far     
beyond the boundaries expected of regional courts26 and gave the Court the 
jurisdiction to interpret and apply “any other relevant Human Rights         
instrument ratified by the state concerned”.27  
 
This can give the Court a wide base of tools ranging from United Nations 
documents to regional as well as sub-regional documents that can be applied 
21 The inclusion of the duties of individuals 
towards the state has not resulted in any 
actual human rights violations as per Mutua 
(supra note 19) or Welch (supra note 4)  
22 Art. 27(1) of the Charter 
23 Art 17(3) of the Charter 
24 C. E. Welch, “Human Rights and African 
Women: A Comparison of Protection Under 
Two Major Treaties” 15 Human Rights   
Quarterly  (1993), 548-574 
25 This might be a reference to the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women (CEDAW) 1979 
 26 For e.g.. the European Court of Human 
Rights applies the European Convention 
27Article 3(1) of the Protocol 
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by the Courts to protect human rights as African states have tended up to now 
to ratify a great many international human rights treaties.28 The only limit 
placed upon the potential application of all these available tools is the       
requirement that the state in question should have ratified any or all of these 
documents. 
 
The potential width of the jurisdiction of the Court, although quite impressive 
and advantageous for the Court in one way, may however present the Court 
with two possible challenges. The first challenge will arise out of the poten-
tial overlapping of jurisdictions of the Court and the host of sub-regional 
bodies that have proliferated under the AU umbrella. This will be analysed in 
the next section. The second problem arises from the fact that Africa is a big 
continent with fifty-three states that have different legal systems and diverse 
patterns of ratification of international treaties. Commentators regularly focus 
on the disunity/diversity that exists within the continent when it comes to the 
treaties they ratify or the reservation they make to the treaties 29 and this dis-
unity is similarly true for the twenty-three states that have ratified the Proto-
col.  
 
Most of the twenty-three states have consistently ratified many of the       
Conventions sponsored by the United Nations30 as well as some of the       
African human rights treaties31, although there are incidences of states not  
ratifying specific conventions. The overall effect of the disunity in the ratifi-
cations will have the effect of creating a system in which the Court will not 
be able to use the same instruments for similar cases from different states and 
the interpretation of rights may, as a consequence, differ. This will mean that 
the Court will find it harder to establish any general or continent-wide 
norms.32 Moreover, there is the issue that as more African states ratify the 
Protocol and accept the jurisdiction of the Court, the erratic pattern the other 
states have ratified human rights instruments will exacerbate this problem. In 
28 In R.W. Eno, “The Jurisdiction of the Afri-
can Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights” 2 
African Human Rights Law Journal (2002), 
223-233,  the author discusses the fact that 
many African states ratify a great many 
treaties due to internal and external pres-
sures and for international public relations 
reasons 
29 J. Allain and C. O’Shea, supra note 14 
30 All 22 states have ratified the ICCPR,    
CEDAW  and the CRC (although the last 
two are subject to reservations by Algeria 
and Libya) 
31For e.g. the OAU Convention Governing 
the specific Aspects of the Refugee Prob-
lems in Africa, The African Charters on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child and The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa  
32Although this is difficult in any system, for 
example, see the ECHR issues and the argu-
ments about margins of appreciation given 
to states in P. Mahoney, “Marvellous Rich-
ness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Rela-
tivism” 19 Human Rights Law Journal 
(1998), pgs 1-5  
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33 In J. Allain & A. O’Shea, supra note 14 the 
authors discuss the fact that some reserva-
tions may not be effective. For example 
Lesotho’s reservation to CEDAW is 
“meaningless” as the Constitution of the 
State includes provisions against sexual 
discrimination and thus it is unlikely that 
compliance with CEDAW would conflict 
with the Constitution. 
34 Note that the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties of 1969 limits the states’  
right to do so. Additionally, the African 
Commission’s jurisprudence has not suf-
fered unduly from any reservation made by 
states as it is not common practice by most 
African states to actually utilize reservations 
as explained by Allain and O’Shea, ibid  
35 Article 6(d) of the EAC Treaty, Article 6 of 
the COMESA Treaty and Article 4(g) of the 
ECOWAS Treaty   
36 N. J. Udombana “Protecting Human Rights 
In Africa through Supra-national Courts” 15 
Interights Bulletin, Vol. 1 (2005), 13-15 (on 
13) 
37 Article 3(1) allows the Court to interpret 
and apply the Protocol itself and article 3(2)          
indicates that the Court has the power to rule 
on or decide a dispute over its jurisdiction. 
addition to the problems caused by the different patterns of ratification of 
human rights treaties, some of the ratifications by these twenty two states 
have been limited in scope by effective reservations.33 
 
These problems will damage the Court’s standing as a source of general 
norms which other courts can follow as the Court will seem to be applying 
Human Rights instruments inconsistently and possibly producing inconsis-
tent judgements. Moreover, there is a possibility that more states will start to 
utilise their right to place reservations on their international duties which will 
further exacerbate the problems to be encountered by the Court.34  
 
2. The Court and other Courts and Institutions 
  
2.1- The Challenge posed by Sub-Regional Courts 
 
The broad jurisdiction of the Court as provided for in Art. 3(1) will raise    
another set of problems as it is not clear whether or not the Court’s            
jurisdiction should extend to interpreting and applying sub-regional           
economic treaties such as the African Economic Community (AEC) Treaty, 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Treaty, the 
East African Community (EAC) Treaty, Economic Community of West     
African States (ECOWAS) Treaty and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Treaty. These treaties are not human rights instruments 
as such, but include human rights concerns or references to the African   
Charter,35 which are integrated into the treaty as “part of the overall objec-
tives of the organisation or as principles underlying their action”. 36 
 
If the Court, in deciding the parameters of its own jurisdiction as allowed by 
the Protocol,37 chooses to apply these instruments as result of their human 
rights dimensions, not only will this contribute to the problems caused by the 
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incoherent ways states ratify treaties (as discussed in the previous section) 
but the problem of overlapping jurisdictions and contradictory decisions will 
also emerge as these treaties have made provisions for their own judicial           
institutions to interpret and apply their treaties. In fact, this problem of     
overlapping jurisdictions may emerge regardless of the Court’s decision to 
apply the treaties or not. This will result from the fact that all the treaties 
have made provisions extending their courts’ jurisdiction to applying and   
interpreting the African Charter. So, whatever the Court decides, there is a 
possibility of overlapping jurisdictions where several courts find themselves 
operating in the same space concurrently. 
 
Having a multiplicity of courts certainly has its advantages as a single court 
is likely to be weighed down with an unmanageable caseload and does        
suggest that there is more political will among the African States to be bound 
by international instruments than there was at the end of the 1990’s.             
However, the existence of these numerous courts adjudicating on the basis of 
the same instruments can have its disadvantages too. In the case of a specific 
violation in a country which has ratified the Protocol and also belongs to one 
of the regional intergovernmental organisations which has its own court, both 
the Court and one of the regional economic community (REC) courts will 
have the competence to interpret the Charter and the treaties of the                
intergovernmental agencies (assuming the Court has decided to interpret and 
apply the REC treaties). This may result in differing/contradicting standards 
of human right protection being produced by the courts which will create 
confusion as to which judgement to apply as the Protocol has in no way        
provided for the Court’s primacy in any situation. This damages the standing 
of the Court, as ideally, there should not be any avenue of doubt as to the   
applicability of the Court’s judgements, especially in matters surrounding the 
interpretation of the African Charter. 
 
This challenge for the Court is further enhanced when considering the fact 
that the Protocol’s failure to establish for the superiority of the Court’s       
competence also extends to situations where the treaties establishing the REC 
courts have been provided with exclusivity clauses, establishing these courts 
primacy in any disputes concerning the application and interpretation of the 
sub-regional/REC treaties.38 
 
Another consideration is that as there are so many courts at the regional and 
sub-regional levels, there is the opportunity for the same case to be brought 
38 G. Naldi and K. Magliveras , “Reinforcing the African System of Human  Rights: The Pro-
tocol on the Establishment of a Regional Court of Human Rights” 16 Netherlands Quarterly 
of Human Rights  (1998), p 431 
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to several different forums with slight alteration to the presentation of the 
case39. Alternatively, there is the possibility that the parties concerned belong 
to various groups and may choose to present the case in one forum but not 
another as it would be more convenient for that one party.40 
 
2.2 The African Court of Justice 
 
The African Union’s Court of Justice (ACJ) is another regional court that has 
the potential of creating challenges for the Court. Originally, some of the 
challenges it may have presented would have been similar to the ones created 
by having so many other courts. However, in July 2004, during the 3rd        
Ordinary Session of the AU, the Assembly of the AU decided to integrate the 
ACJ and the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights due to a lack of 
financial resources for two new separate institutions41. This was a wise         
decision as it is questionable whether African states have the “material 
wherewithal to operate two supra national judicial institutions”.42 This 
merger poses an additional advantage in that all problems of overlapping and        
concurrent jurisdiction and possible contradictory decisions will be avoided. 
Nevertheless, this merger in itself may actually present the Court with one of 
the greatest challenges to date. 
 
To implement this merger, it has been suggested the Court will be made into 
a subsidiary branch of the ACJ which after the merger will be renamed the 
Court of Justice and Human Rights of the African Union.43 This merger was 
clarified by the Draft Protocol on the Integration of the African Court on   
Human and Peoples Rights and the Court of Justice of the African Union 
(draft merger document) where it was explained that the ACJ would become 
the “principal judicial organ of the African Union” (Art. 2(2)) and “the Court 
39 C. A. Odinkalu raised this point in a Pres-
entation titled: “Complementarity, Competi-
tion or Contradiction: The Relationship be-
tween the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and Regional Economic 
Courts in East and Southern Africa”, Con-
ference of East and Southern African States 
on the Protocol Establishing the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights,    
Gaborone, Botswana, 9-10 December 2003 
40 This is called forum-shopping in the United 
States of America, when plaintiffs bring the 
same case to the court which will be most 
favourable to their case, which has negative 
aspects on the concepts of justice and      
fairness. 
41 Decision on the Merger of the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
the Court of Justice of the African Union, 
Doc. EX/CL/162 (VI) 
 
42 N.J. Udombana, “An African Human 
Rights Court and an African Union Court: A 
Needful Duality or a Needless Duplication” 
28 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 
(2003), 811-866 
 
43 Draft Protocol on the Integration of the 
African Court on Human and Peoples 
Rights and the Court of Justice of the Afri-
can Union , EX.CL/195 (VII), Art. 2(1) 
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shall be constituted by a Specialised Human and Peoples’ Rights Judicial Di-
vision” (Art. 2(3)) which will be one of the “special chambers” that the Pro-
tocol Establishing the ACJ44 has made provisions for. 
 
Many NGO’s and academics have been against the merger as they argue this 
would mean that the Court would lose its independence from the AU and 
possible from the political concerns of the member states as well as lose its 
specialised nature.45 The second set of concerns was raised with regards to 
the differences that exist between the two institutions, such as the different 
levels of expertise of the judges as well as the different competences of the 
courts (even if there are areas of overlapping jurisdiction).46 However, the 
draft merger document has addressed this issue somewhat as it includes pro-
visions for at least seven of the judges to have a higher level of expertise in 
human rights laws as per Art.3(1) of the draft merger document 
 
All the concerns or advantages aside, the two courts have not yet been inte-
grated and both institutions are developing at their own respective paces and 
thus they are in different phases of establishment. This is due to the decision 
taken during the 5th Ordinary Session in July 2005, in Sirte, Libya, where the 
assembly decided to establish the African Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights immediately and not wait for the merger document to be ratified or for 
the protocol document establishing the ACJ into force.47 Once the ACJ proto-
col and/or the draft merger document comes into force (whichever comes 
first), it is likely that the merging process will take place and this may not be 
an easy task for the African Union or the African human rights system in 
general. 
 
3. The Commission and the Court 
 
The one institution that will have the greatest effect on the Court is the Afri-
can Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights due to Article 5 of the     
Protocol, which provides that the only groups who have automatic access to 
the Court are African states, African Intergovernmental organizations as well 
44 Draft Protocol Relating to the Statute, 
Composition and Functions of the Court of 
Justice of the African Union, CAB/
LEG/23.20/45/VOL/II (2003) (the Draft 
Protocol of the ACJ) 
 
45 C. A. Odinkalu, “Judicial Nomination Pro-
cedure for the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights” 15 Interights Bulletin, Vol. 
1 (2005), 28-30 (on 29) 
46 Amnesty International Press Release, 
“African Union: Assembly’s Decision 
Should not Undermine the African Court”,  
AI Index: IOR 30/020/2004 (Public), 9 Au-
gust 2004  
47 Coalition of an Effective African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, “About the 
African Court”,  
  h t tp : / /www.afr icancour tcoa l i t ion .org /
editorial.asp?page_id=16  (accessed 27/5/07) 
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as the Commission. It is generally the view that states normally will not use 
their standing to bring other states to the Court48 just as the African intergov-
ernmental organisations won’t use their standing in a significant way as these 
bodies tend to have their own courts. It therefore remains for the Commission 
to bring the majority (if not all) of the cases to the Court. The Commission’s 
influence on the Court is further strengthened by Article 8, which states that 
there should be complementarity between the Commission and the Court as 
the reason the Court was founded in the first place was to reinforce the pro-
tective mandate of the Commission as well as to improve the image of hu-
man rights and the Commission in Africa. 
 
These two provisions, read in conjunction, may be interpreted as meaning 
that the Commission and the Court will exist as a two-tiered system, where 
cases must be considered first by the Commission and then by the Court. 
This will be similar to the way the European system used to function before 
the establishment of the single permanent court49 as well as being similar to 
the way the Inter-American system functions.50 
 
If the African system, like the Inter-American system or the old European 
system chooses to accept the image of the Commission and the Court as be-
ing part of a two-tiered system acting within a single regional human rights 
regime, the African Court will have to decide whether the Court will ulti-
mately accept the Commission’s decisions about the admissibility of cases as 
well as to what extent the Court will adopt the Commission’s findings and 
decisions/recommendations. In other words, the Court will have to decide as 
to the extent and intensity of the independence of the Court from the influ-
ence of the Commission. 
 
In deciding its Rules of Procedures, the Court can apply Article 651 to its full 
extent so that when a case is presented to the Court, (even by the Commis-
sion), despite the fact that the Commission has already decided on the admis-
sibility of the case on the basis of the same Charter provision (Article 56), the 
Court can repeat the procedure. Likewise, the Court can choose to maintain 
48 According to Judge Piza Escalante of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 
the case of Vivianna Gallardoet al, v Costa, 
No. G 101/81, Judgement of November 13, 
1981, 20 I.L.M. 1424 (1981); Human Rights 
Law Journal 328 (1981) 
49 R. Murray, “A Comparison Between the 
African and European Courts of Human 
Rights” 2 African Human Rights Law Jour-
nal (2002), 195-222 (on 201))  
50 D. Padilla, “An African Human Rights 
Court: Reflections from the Perspective of 
the Inter-American System”, 2 African Hu-
man Rights Law Journal (2002), 185-194, 
and A. E. Dulitzky, “The Relationship    
between the African Commission and the 
African Court: Lessons from the Inter-
American System” 15 Interights Bulletin 
Vol. 1 (2005)  
51 Article 6 of the Protocol  
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its relative independence and get involved in fact-finding procedures,52 with-
out having to accept the findings of the Commission.  
 
This higher level of independence of the Court may present the Court with 
the advantage of not being burdened with the “severe image problems…
associated”53 with the Commission, as it is possible that the Court will be 
judged deficient due to the image of the Commission. The additional advan-
tage of keeping the Court independent of any of the Commission’s decisions 
and findings will lie in the fact that the Court’s procedures, as laid out in    
Articles 27-30, provide for more depth and formality in the Court inquiries 
and judgments than can be provided for by the less legally structured      
Commission54 whose procedures suffer from several defects. Critics of the 
Commission often point out the Commission’s procedural defects which 
have tended to include problems such as delays in between the final hearing 
and dissemination of the findings55 (which are also not disseminated widely 
enough).56  
 
Moreover, the fact that the Commission tended not to give very long or any 
properly reasoned decisions,57 and has in the past been known to issue deci-
sions without the full facts of cases58 further strengthen the argument for 
keeping the two institutions separate. However, in recent years, the Commis-
sion has improved its reports by presenting much longer and much more de-
52 As provided for by Article 26 of the      
Protocol 
 
53 M.  Mutua, supra note 19, page 360 
 
54 J. Harrington “The African Court on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights”  in M.D. Evans 
and R. Murray (eds.), The African Charter 
of Human and Peoples’ Rights- System in 
Practice, (Cambridge University Press, 
2002) 
 
55 This is as Article 55 of the Charter places 
no time-constraints on the Commission to 
release its decision, which has in several 
cases means that the Commission could 
potentially spend up to several years to 
come to a decision (ibid) 
 
56 M. Mutua, supra note 19, points out that 
“The Commission arranges its decisions into 
sections dealing with facts…admissibility of 
evidence and the final conclusion. However, 
each of these sections is scant in both sub-
stance and reasoning”  
56 For e.g, J. Harrington, supra note 54, points 
out the case of Communication 59/91, Em-
bga Mekongo Louis v Cameroon, Eighth 
Activity Report 1994-1995, Annex VI 
(Documents of the African Commission) 
which was a case where the Commission 
issued a decision without any information 
on the facts of the cases.  
57 M. Mutua, supra note 19, says: “The Com-
mission arranges its decisions into sections 
dealing with facts…admissibility of evi-
dence and the final conclusion. However, 
each of these sections is scant in both sub-
stance and reasoning” 
58 For e.g., J. Harrington, supra note 54, 
points out the case of Communication 
59/91, Embga Mekongo Louis v Cameroon, 
Eighth Activity Report 1994-1995, Annex 
VI (Documents of the African Commission) 
which was a case where the Commission 
issued a decision without any information 
on the facts of the cases.  
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tailed reasoned reports.59 This improvement notwithstanding, some academ-
ics continue to argue that the Commission’s reports are still not adequately 
improved enough for them to be a credit to the Court.60 In addition, the Com-
mission’s reports are based on a quasi-judicial procedure, thus the resulting 
report may not be sufficiently compatible with the Court, which will require 
a higher level of legalism in its procedures. Furthermore, keeping the Court 
and the Commission’s institutional identities somewhat separate will allow 
the Court to explore possible avenues of development (as was intended in the 
drafting of the protocol, which foresaw a conciliatory role for the Court61) as 
opposed to a simple system of being a forum for appeals for decisions taken 
by the Commission. 
 
On the other hand, the Court’s retention of so much independence might    
disadvantage the Court. The most obvious disadvantage of having the Court 
carrying out its own procedures of deciding the admissibility of cases and 
actually engaging in full fact-finding hearings is the fact that this may       
potentially mean that the Commission and the Court are engaged in carrying 
out identical functions. This duplication of labour will be a waste of financial 
resources, especially considering the fact that both institutions receive their 
limited budgets from the same source. This is a crucial point for African su-
pra-national institutions, which tend to be underfinanced.63  Similarly, the 
duplication of procedural requirements will also waste time, especially in 
view of the fact that both the Commission and the Charter will have to carry 
out the admissibility procedures in line with Article 56 of the African Char-
ter. Moreover, the Commission has been deciding the admissibility of cases 
and engaging in full fact-finding mission for some time and its experiences in 
theses areas have reached a level of professionalism which can ultimately 
benefit the Court a great deal. 
 
Finally, the overstatement of the Court’s independence will disadvantage the 
Court as there is a risk that the Commission will not feel enough of a 
‘partnership’ with the Court to co-operate in any way with the court. This 
59 C. A Odinkalu and C. Christensen, “The 
African Commission on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights: The Development of its Non-
State Communication Procedures”, 20 Hu-
man Rights Quarterly  (1998), 235f  (on 
page 277) 
60 A. Motola, “Celebrating Two Decades if 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights”, Pambazuka News, 22nd  June 2006, 
as available on http://www.pambazuka.org/
en/category/features/35337  
61 Article 9 of the Protocol 
 
62 C. E. Welch, supra note 4 
 
63 This problem actually afflicted the Inter-
American System, as the Commission 
“avoided sending cases on (to the Court) by 
broadly interpreting its discretion as to 
which cases to submit…as a result the Court 
was precluded from exercising its conten-
tious jurisdiction for almost a decade” as per 
A. E. Dulitzky, supra note 50  
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64 G. Naldi and K. Magliveras, supra note 38, 
pg. 434  
 
65 A. Lloyd and R. Murray, “Institutions With 
Responsibility For Human Rights Protection 
Under the African Union”, 48 Journal of 
African Law Vol. 2 (2004), 165-186, at 184 
66  Lloyd and Murray ibid refer to the “need 
for co-ordination…from within the AU to 
ensure that human rights remain central to 
its agenda” 
67 Although, the Commission’s findings have 
improved, see C. A Odinkalu and C. Chris-
tensen, supra note 57 
may result in a situation where the Commission may choose to function as it 
has always functioned and will, as a result, broadly interpret its discretion as 
to which case to submit to the court. 64As a consequence, very few cases may 
be sent on to the Court by the Commission which will in effect mean that the 
Court will hear a small number of cases at best, or more likely, none at all. 
Furthermore, if the Commission chooses to continue exercising its full     
protective mandate, a situation of overlapping jurisdictions between the 
Court and the Commission will develop,64 with all the potential problems 




In conclusion, it becomes apparent that the Court is being added onto a      
system which is going through a period of “considerable confusion and 
flux”65 with many new institutions coming into being with little or no regard 
to any of the other institutions or to the already-established mechanisms 
while the older system remaining largely unchanged. This has created a    
system where there is/will be a lack of consistency and co-ordination in the 
way common (human rights) goals are approached in the different AU      
bodies.66 This deficiency can affect the Court’s operations adversely in      
several different ways.  
 
Firstly, the lack of co-ordination, as illustrated by the potential situations of 
possible contradictory judgements, overlapping jurisdictions and duplication 
of labour between the Court and other AU institutions can lead to a great deal 
of uncertainty as to the position of the Court within the regional system,     
especially due to the fact that the Protocol fails to provide for the Court’s   
primacy in all human rights matters. Secondly, the failure to clarify the      
relationship between the Court and the Commission, which is symptomatic 
of the lack of consolidation between the institutions, will result in a situation 
where an institution outside the Court’s influence will have the power to    
decide whether the Court will hear any cases at all. This clearly shows that 
the Court will depend on the Commission, which has been to a large part 
condemned for its ineffectiveness.67 Even if the defects of the Commission 
will not in reality affect the function of the Court, the image of the Court as a 
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body that is dependant on this much criticised institution can mean that the 
Court will not be able to inspire as much respect from the states which the 
Court will ideally require to establish itself as the most important human 
rights court on the continent.  
 
Most of these problems can be solved by amending the Charter (removing 
clawback clauses etc.) as well as the Protocol (widening the standing         
provisions in response to current efforts to afford NGO’s automatic       
standing). However, these amendments can only be made by African states 
just as it is a matter for the states to comply with the judgements. This will 
mean that unless the states are prepared to sacrifice some of their  interests as 
well as some of their sovereignty for the good of the regional system, the 
Court will not be able to effectively and independently play a  significant role 
in the enforcement of human rights. It will therefore be necessary for all the 
African States to display more political will and dedication to the human 
rights movement which will in short mean that long-standing African atti-
tudes will have to change more than they already have. Commitment of Afri-
can states to rule of law is expected to increase in the years to come so that 
they can be engrained in Africa’s  political culture. This will undoubtedly 
take some time. This is clearly manifested in the slow ratification pace of the 
Court’s establishment protocol. Thus the expectation that the Court can im-
mediately “cure” all the problems of the regional human rights system seems 
to be unachievable in the short term. 
 
